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ABSTRACT:  I critically review recent studies that estimate those costs of violence and 
conflict that can emerge among organized political groupings, from states, religious and 
ethnic organizations to guerillas and paramilitaries.  The review includes studies that 
estimate direct and indirect costs due to internal conflicts (civil wars and other lower-
level conflicts), terrorism, and external conflicts, including military spending.  There are 
a number of key theoretical concerns on what counts as a cost, and, depending on the 
methods and evidence used, estimated costs vary widely.  However, even minimum 
estimates are economically significant, especially for low-income countries. This is even 
more so when the costs of different types of organized conflict and violence are 
aggregated. 
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discussions and comments, and Nathan Fiala for research assistance.Violence can occur at virtually all levels of human interaction—from domestic violence 
within households, to fighting between youth gangs, to guerilla warfare, to wars between 
states or between alliances of states.  Although all forms of conflict and violence can be 
expected to have economic consequences, this aspect has been neglected by economists 
until relatively recently.
1  However, research in this area has accelerated in the past 
decade as it becomes increasingly evident to academics and policymakers that wars and 
other conflicts have high costs that can severely impede economic development.  In this 
paper I review recent studies that estimate the costs of violence and conflict that can 
emerge between organized political groupings such as states, religious and ethnic 
organizations, political parties, unions, guerillas, or paramilitaries.  In particular, I 
examine the costs associated with: 
•  Internal conflicts: More than 70 countries have experienced civil war since World 
War II (Fearon and Laitin 2003). The median length of a civil war is more than 
seven years and the costs include the loss of life (at least 16 million in such wars); 
the destruction of crops, buildings, and infrastructure; the cost of arms; the wages 
or opportunity cost of soldiers or guerrillas; the cost of injuries and psychological 
incapacitation (which can be long-lasting); as well as long-term consequences on 
investment and economic growth. 
Civil war is not the sole form of violent conflict that can occur within 
countries.  Lower-level insurgencies, as well as protests, strikes, boycotts, road-
blocks, and similar "appropriative" activities that are undertaken by well-
organized groups can lead to violence.  We will touch upon these lower-level 
                                                 
1 Studying the effects of conflict and violence from an economic perspective is perhaps more difficult than 
studying the effects of ordinary economic activities.  This is because the basic theoretical framework of 
economics—and, as a result, much empirical research—assumes that property rights are perfectly and 
costlessly enforced.  Conflict and violence directly contradict this assumption.  Furthermore, engaging in 
conflict and violence against others is an adversarial activity, not a socially cooperative or productive one, 
as economic activities typically are.  (For an overview of the theoretical literature on conflict that formally 
examines these issues, see Garfinkel and Skaperdas 2007.)  Identifying what is a cost (and what is a 
benefit) of conflict, then, can be confusing and potentially controversial.  However, regardless of method, 
even the minimum estimated costs of conflict and violence appear to be higher than estimated deadweight 
costs that are typically of major concern to economists (such as the effects of taxation, regulation, or trade 
protection) and therefore potentially of higher economic significance than the effects of more exhaustively 
studied distortions. 
 types of conflict, although there is less evidence on them than there is for civil 
wars. 
•  Terrorism:  In some cases, violence is directed at civilians who may not even be 
related to the political target of the perpetrating group, resulting in what has come 
to be referred to as terrorism.  Properly speaking, terrorism is a tactic that is 
usually part of a larger conflict that can be internal to a country (like in Sri Lanka 
or Spain’s Basque region) or transnational in scope (like that of al Qaeda).  We 
review the costs of it separately from internal and external conflicts primarily 
because some of the recent literature on the costs of violence and conflict has 
focused on terrorism. 
•  External conflicts:  Although external wars between states have been fewer and 
caused less direct damage than internal wars since World War II, they have 
remained very costly for some countries (for example, Afghanistan and Vietnam) 
that have been involved in such warfare.  Despite the relative paucity of such 
wars, perceived external threats induce considerable military expenditures. For 
2004 world military spending was estimated to be over 1 trillion dollars, about 2.6 
percent of world gross domestic product (GDP) (SIPRI 2005), a considerable 
expenditure by any measure. 
 
Excluded from this review are the costs of organized crime, a global activity in which the 
threat and use of violence are integral.  Journalistic reports even argue that organized 
crime accounts for one-fifth of world GDP (Glenny 2008).  However, to my knowledge 
there are very few systematic economic studies that estimate the costs of violence due to 
organized crime and this is the main reason for excluding them here.
2
 
The costs of violence and conflict are not just those incurred directly when there is overt 
violence.  Efforts to prevent overt violence from occurring, as during cold wars or in the 
low-level suppression of insurgencies, racks up economic costs as well. Consider that 
most military equipment and many soldiers have never faced or will never face war, yet 
                                                 
2  A recent study (Asmundo and Lisciandra 2008) provides a lower bound estimate for the cost of 
protection in Sicily to be 1.4 percent of gross regional product.  However, this is mostly an estimate of 
transfer costs (the protection payments) rather than the net economic costs of the Sicilian Mafia.  Skaperdas 
(2001) provides an overview of the economics of organized crime. still need to be purchased or paid.  Moreover, the potential for conflict, even if it never 
materializes, can have powerful negative incentive effects on investment, trade, and 
economic growth.  Though difficult to identify, some of the studies we review attempt to 
capture these negative effects of conflict potential that may never materialize 
 
The first section of this paper briefly discusses the types of costs we review and the 
methods used to measure and estimate them.  The second section reviews the estimates of 
different types of costs associated with civil war, other forms of internal conflict, 
terrorism, and external wars.  Coverage of the expanding literature is not meant to be 
comprehensive: Instead, I selectively review contributions from the different categories 
of costs that have been examined. The final section identifies potential gaps of the costs 
that might not be adequately taken into account.   
 
 
1.  Methods of Measurement and Types of Costs 
 
The cost to replace a house that has been destroyed during warfare, and the loss of the 
benefit of its services, can be calculated relatively easily.  The cost of lost tourism in a 
volatile region, or the effects of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) on its residents, 
however, are less easy to estimate and depend in part on the method of measurement and 
empirical model employed by the researcher.  The range of probable values of such costs 
can then vary widely.  In this way, a continuum of possibilities exists when estimating the 
costs of violence, from considering only the most direct costs that have an easily 
calculable value to estimating different indirect costs. These further depend on what 
channels of causality, scenarios, and counterfactuals are assumed or which models are 
estimated. 
 
The methods to estimate costs that have been used in the literature reviewed here, as well 
as the types of costs that have been estimated, are now briefly discussed. 
 
1.1 Direct Costs: Accounting Within and Outside Budgets 
 The costs that can be directly attributed to a violent event (or a series of such events, as in 
a war) can be in principle counted using conventional accounting methods.  Some of 
these direct costs typically include the following: 
 
•  destroyed public infrastructure   
•  destroyed factories and machinery 
•  destroyed housing, autos, and other personal property 
•  budgetary appropriations for cost of war and cost of lost equipment 
•  deaths 
•  physical and mental injuries 
•  future costs of disability 
•  future costs of physical and mental health care 
 
Information on some of these costs can be easily obtained or inferred from government 
budgets or estimated using straightforward methods.  Other direct costs, however, can be 
more difficult to calculate.  Even some costs that are part of a government’s war budget 
can be hidden in items that are not related to any particular defense expenditure, let alone 
part of a particular appropriation for a war.  For example, many of the expenditures of the 
Iraq and Afghanistan wars are not to be found in the appropriation bills for these wars, 
but elsewhere in the U.S. budget (Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008). 
 
Accounting for the costs of deaths and injuries also goes beyond the costs included in 
some budgets (such as the death and life insurance benefit for soldiers that might be 
provided by their country).  Such accounting requires confronting the issue of the value 
of life and, even more seriously, whether the life of a citizen of a poor country should be 
valued differently than a citizen of a rich country.  Other questions regarding some 
difficult-to-measure direct costs include: How do you account for the pain and suffering 
of the physically and mentally injured?  What about the lost wages and other missed 
opportunities of family members who have to care for the long-term disabled?  Moreover, 
since a substantial portion of these costs will be incurred in the future, calculating their 
present value requires not just estimates of their future trajectory but also assumptions 
about the discount rate that is employed in such calculations.  
1.2 Indirect Costs 
 
Indirect costs of violence and conflict typically include: 
 
•  population displacement 
•  reduced production due to violence or its threat 
•  reduced trade due to violence or its threat 
•  lower current and future physical investment 
•  reduction in educational opportunities 
•  brain drain (that is, emigration of educated work force) 
•  reduced tourism from abroad 
•  other macroeconomic effects (inflation, further unemployment, reduced economic 
growth) 
•  overall welfare costs 
 
Simply using an accounting method does not suffice in the estimation of such costs.  The 
use of counterfactual worlds in which conflict is absent, models of such worlds, 
econometric estimation, quasi-experimental methods, and combination of these methods 
have been used in estimating indirect costs of conflict.  We briefly outline two main 
classes of these methods next. 
 
Estimating indirect costs under different scenarios. A simple way of estimating some 
indirect costs is to create scenarios in the absence of conflict and, based on previous 
empirical estimates of parameters under similar scenarios, make comparisons between 
the “conflict” and “nonconflict” scenarios.   
 
A simple example of how some indirect effects might be estimated is found in the long-
run effects of budgetary expenditures through “multiplier” effects. The cost of war 
expenditures on foreign soil, for instance, may not involve just its opportunity cost in 
other types of expenditures but may well lead to lower multiplier effects because a 
significant portion of the expenditures “leak” outside the country (see Stiglitz and Bilmes 2008 on the costs of the Iraq war).  In a very different context, Evia et al. (2008) estimate 
some indirect costs of sociopolitical conflict in Bolivia by assigning different disruption 
coefficients to different incidents (for example, road blockades, strikes, lockouts) in 
estimating such indirect costs of conflict for the economy.
3
 
The advantage of such methods is that they are rather easy to perform and, if previous 
estimates of key parameters are reliable, the obtained estimates of costs can be plausible, 
at least as a first approximation.  The disadvantage is that such estimates might take 
inadequate account of general equilibrium interactions and complex effects that cannot be 
detected through simple scenario calculations.  However, these estimates are usually 
taken as rough, with wide bounds for probable range of values typically provided. 
 
 Estimating indirect costs via regressions. With appropriate data, counterfactual scenarios 
could be estimated and tested econometrically.  For instance, in a cross-country growth 
regression that includes a variable for a particular type of conflict, one could compare the 
differential effects of that conflict on growth by calculating the effect of the conflict 
variable in the estimated equation.
4  As an example of that approach, Collier (1999) 
employed such an approach for a sample of 92 countries (19 of which had civil wars), 
using as the dependent variable the decade average of per capita GDP between 1960 and 
1989.  As one measure of the level of conflict, Collier used the number of months that 
each country had been in civil war during the decade.  In addition to control variables, 
Collier also used a variable for postwar recovery and its interaction with the months-of-
war variable.  Blomberg et al. (2004) offer another example that employed a similar 
approach using many different data sources for a large number of countries, with four 
                                                 
3 A strike, for example, was assumed to induce 2.77 times the estimated direct economic losses of the event 
because of the potential disruption to related industries.  The activity with the greatest disruption multiplier 
assumed (12.5 times its estimated direct economic cost) was an urban blockade. Due to the population 
density in cities, it was estimated that every individual participating in an urban blockade affects 100 more 
individuals, but not for the same amount of time of the blockade, since people have other options to move 
around. The study assigned one hour loss per individual suffering a blockade in the city. This is 1/8 of a 
labor day, so that the final effect was 100*1/8=12.5 (see Appendix A in Evia et al. 2008). 
4 Of course, such an exercise would be subject to critiques aimed at cross-country growth regressions in 
general, as well as on how the particular regression has been implemented. different types of conflict,
5 and in addition to cross-country and panel regressions used 
vector autoregression (VAR) methods to identify possible causal directions and the 
economic costs of different types of conflict.  In this case, the inclusion of different types 
of conflict allows for the detection of possible complementarities between different types 
of conflict; for example, terrorism and certain types of internal ethnic conflict could be 
complements and the analysis might tease out which effect is more important.   
 
Given the econometric estimates, the effects of various types of conflict could be 
calculated by considering a “counterfactual” country or region that has the same 
characteristics as the country or region in question, but without conflict.  Of course, such 
approaches can be criticized on many grounds.
6 The most fundamental problem is 
typically the possible endogeneity of conflict when estimating its costs and effects on 
investment, growth, capital flight, tourism, and so on, and therefore there is the 
possibility that the causality could be reverse from that assumed.  After all, low or 
negative growth can cause conflict (Miguel et al. 2004).  Different studies attempt to 
overcome this problem by using Instrumental Variables, but some healthy skepticism is 
warranted in considering such estimates, just as in the case of the scenario-based 
estimates of indirect costs.  The further one moves from easily measurable direct costs, 
the more uncertain and subject to argument are the estimates of many indirect costs.  
 
2. Reviewing the Findings on the Costs of Conflict 
 
In reviewing the findings I will break down the literature into four categories: Civil wars, 
lower-level internal conflicts, terrorism, and external wars.  As civil wars have been most 
studied, and their effects have been the costliest and most wide-ranging for low-income 
countries, I will discuss civil wars in terms of the different categories of costs examined 
in the literature.  
 
2.1 Internal Conflicts: Civil wars 
 
                                                 
5  The four types of conflict are terrorism, internal wars, external wars away from home territory, and 
external wars at home.  
6  See, for example, the critique of Blomberg et al. (2004) by Garfinkel and Jeliazkov (2004). Civil wars are typically defined as those types of internal conflict that involve the 
government and at least one other party. They also feature a threshold of deaths—
typically, 1,000 per year.
7 Collier et al. (2003) provide a comprehensive discussion of the 
different types of costs associated with civil wars and offer an overview of different 
quantitative estimates.  The two edited volumes by Stewart and Fitzgerald (2001) also 
contain a number of country studies and overall evaluation of the effects of war on 
economic development.  Two recent overviews are Blattman and Miguel (2008), a survey 
of the theory, causes, and consequences of civil wars, and Collier et al. (2008), a policy-
oriented piece that includes estimates of the costs of civil wars. We provide a breakdown 
of the different types of costs and report some of the findings from these and other recent 
studies. 
 
Budgetary costs. As reported in Collier et al. (2003), the average developing country in 
1995 (one with less than $3,000 per capita GDP) increased its military expenditures 
during civil wars from 2.8 to 5 percent of GDP.
8  That is, before accounting for other 
direct and indirect costs, on average the extra cost of military expenditures due to civil 
wars is 2.2 percent of GDP.  Furthermore, other government revenues and 
expenditures—and, therefore, the public goods they supply—tend to decrease with the 
length of the war.  In a sample of six countries, for example, Fitzgerald et al. (2001) 
report that tax revenues during war decreased or remained flat relative to GDP in five 
(Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Uganda) and increased in only one 
(Nicaragua).  Then, reductions in the fiscal capacity of states to provide for public goods 
such as basic health care and other social services induces various indirect effects on the 
population to withstand disease, injury, malnutrition, and poverty. 
  
                                                 
7  However, there are considerable issues of concern in the definitions that are employed in data sources. 
The different thresholds for deaths and the classification of a war as internal (instead of, say, colonial) are 
two of the main concerns.  Sambanis (2004) provides a detailed account of the issues and the empirical 
consequences of using different definitions of civil war.  
8 There is no direct reference on how these figures were calculated, but it appears they were derived by 
using the estimated coefficients for a cross-country type regression.  Additionally, note that a higher 
percentage of GDP devoted to military expenditures could, in principle, result from a sufficiently 
precipitous drop in GDP without a change in actual defense expenditures.  However, the reduction in per 
capita GDP due to civil war was estimated to be on the order of 2 percent by Collier (1999) and growth 
rates for a country in civil war are not typically negative.  Therefore, the increases in military expenditures 
cannot be due to decreases in GDP alone. Destruction of capital, investment, and capital flight. Infrastructure—roads, bridges, 
railroads, public buildings, hospitals—are often at the center of fighting between rebels 
and governments.  Private capital, such as factories and housing and cattle are also often 
subject to significant destruction.  There are currently no studies that systematically 
quantify these costs and compare them across countries, but in nations that have 
experienced long wars, these costs are high.  For Mozambique, which experienced war 
continually from 1964 to the early 1990s, Bruck (2001) has made the following 
estimates: From 1980 to 1993 the stock of cattle had decreased 20 percent; from 1983 to 
1991 almost 60 percent of primary schools were closed or destroyed; and overall, 40 
percent of immobile capital was nonoperational and destroyed.  For Nicaragua, Fitzgerald 
and Grigsby (2001) have estimated that, over the years of most intense conflict (1987–
1989), the cumulative total economic damages were equal to about one year’s GDP.   
 
Collier et al. (2003) also reports estimates of capital flight for countries in civil war. In 
these, the share of private wealth held abroad goes from 9 percent before the war to 20 
percent by its end.  Moreover, as far as capital is concerned, war according to Collier et 
al. has lasting effects—by the end of first decade of postconflict peace, capital flight rises 
to 26.1 percent.  However, as mentioned in the following section on terrorism, Blomberg 
et al. (2004) find neither a statistically or economically significant effect of internal 
conflict on investment. 
 
Effects on growth. According to Collier’s (1999) estimates, countries at war grow around 
2.2 percentage points more slowly than during peace.  Long-lasting wars tend to induce 
lower levels of growth.  Stewart, Huang, and Wang (2001) calculate the difference in 
growth rates for 14 countries at war and compare them with those of comparable 
countries. They found them lagging on average about 3.4 percentage points in GDP.
9  
More recently, Cerra and Saxena (2008) estimate the effect of civil wars on economic 
growth using the beginning of civil war as a shock in a VAR model.  Using impulse 
response functions, the immediate effect of a civil war is estimated to induce a reduction 
                                                 
9 However, the sample includes Iran and Iraq which were engaged in external war during part of the sample 
period, with Iraq experiencing the worst performance of all 14 countries in the sample. of 6 percentage points in GDP, although almost half of that loss is recovered after about 
six years, and the long-run estimates are imprecise in the sense that the standard error 
bands allow for the possibility of a zero long-run effect.  In the event of a long civil war, 
these negative effects on growth can be expected to compound over time and it is not 
clear to what extent output can be expected to partially recover in the long run, as it does 
in the impulse response to a theoretical one-time shock. 
 
Country experiences in terms of growth of course vary widely.  Afghanistan’s GDP per 
capita fell by 20 percent from 1980 to 1990 and by 7.5 percent per year from 1990 to 
1995 (Mardsen and Samman 2001). Sri Lanka, on the other hand, has experienced robust 
growth rates during war.  In fact, according to O’Sullivan (2001), Sri Lanka experienced 
a 4.4 percent GDP growth rate during war and only 3.2 percent in the absence of war. 
One possible reason for such a performance was the geographical concentration of war in 
the Tamil areas of the island that left the rest of the country relatively unaffected.  
Speaking of regional differences, Miguel and Roland (2006) exploit the regional variation 
of the air bombing campaign of the U.S. in Vietnam in order to estimate long-run effects 
of conflict.  They find that areas that suffered heavy bombing did not suffer a long-run 
negative impact on poverty rates, consumption levels, infrastructure, or literacy.  It could 
be that this finding is due to the absence of long-run effects from bombing.  Nevertheless, 
it is also likely that the Vietnamese government directed more resources towards the 
areas that were heavily bombed—they may have built more modern infrastructure that 
enhanced the growth potential of these areas over those that were not as heavily bombed, 
and thus retained their older infrastructure.  In addition, Vietnam has been a rather poor 
country in terms of absolute levels of income since the war ended, and the war likely had 
an effect on its growth rate.  The possible diversion of resources to the more heavily 
bombed areas likely reduced the country’s overall growth rate. 
 
Another long-term effect of civil war according to Collier et al. (2003) is that military 
expenditures increase permanently, on average, to 4.5 percent of GDP, instead of 
reverting to 2.8 percent.  That implies a long-term substitution of 1.7 percentage points of 
GDP that become unavailable for civilian investment, other public expenditures, and consumption. This comes in addition to the possible permanent reduction in income 
induced by civil war. 
 
Mortality and health. A conservative estimate of the deaths directly attributable to civil 
war between 1945 and 1999 is 16.2 million (Fearon and Laitin 2003).  The World Health 
Organization (WHO) estimates that in 1999, wars directly caused 269,000 deaths 
(Ghobarah et al. 2003), a number that is a bit lower than in previous years.  The 
International Rescue Committee estimates that 5.4 million people have died from war-
related causes in the Democratic Republic of Congo since 1998 alone.
 10
 
For public policy purposes, the cost of death in rich countries is usually monetized using 
estimates of the value of life.  For example, to estimate the cost of U.S. soldiers’ deaths, 
Stiglitz and Bilmes (2008) use $7.2 million as the Value of Statistical Life (VSL), which 
is consistent with recent usage.  However, Stiglitz and Bilmes did not think it was 
appropriate to use a different figure to estimate the cost of death for Iraqis.  But making 
rough estimates might help to gain a sense of what the cost of death in low-income 
countries might be.  For instance, if we were to value the life of a citizen of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo at 1/72 of that of an American citizen (that is, $100,000), 
the total cost would be $540 billion over the past 10 years (for comparison, the CIA 
World Factbook estimated the GDP of the country in 2007 to be a little over $19 billion 
at purchasing power parity).  Even if the value of life in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo were considered at 1/720 of an American life ($10,000), still the cost would be 
$54 billion.  What such numbers indicate is that no matter how one views the loss of life 
in civil wars, these losses pose an immense cost to both the deceased’s loved ones and 
their country. 
 
One persistent source of death and injury that lasts beyond the length of a war is 
landmines.  The International Campaign to Ban Landmines estimated the total number of 
such casualties to be between 15,000 and 20,000 in 2001 (Collier et al. 2003).  Such 
figures represent a significant improvement from previous years, when casualties from 
landmines were estimated to be around 26,000 per year.  This reduction is attributed to 
                                                 
10 http://www.theirc.org/special-report/congo-forgotten-crisis.html the 1997 international ban on antipersonnel mines.  Landmines can also have serious 
economic consequences.  Not only may injured farmers be unable to work, but land that 
is suspected to be populated with mines can be underutilized or abandoned, further 
contributing to the affected population’s poverty.  Merrouche (2008) offers a case study 
of the effect of landmines in Mozambique, one of the most heavily mined countries in the 
world.  The study finds that going from an average number of landmines to none is 
associated with an 11 point decrease in the fraction of impoverished people and a 27 
percent increase in daily consumption. 
    
Beyond mortality and injury, civilian populations plagued by war become highly 
vulnerable to disease as a result of worse nutrition, living conditions in camps, or 
deteriorating health care.  Malaria, diarrhea, respiratory infections, AIDS, even measles 
and meningitis occur more frequently during wartime and result in higher death rates than 
in times of peace (Collier et al. 2003).  Measures exist for aggregating the impact of 
different diseases, such as disability-adjusted life years (DALYs).
11  For 1999 alone, 8.44 
million DALYs were directly attributed to wars (Ghobarah et al. 2003).  Moreover, 
during the same year an additional 8 million DALYs were lost as a result of wars that 
ended in the years 1991–1997.  In principle, one could use such estimates, along with 
their value in terms of prevailing wages and estimates for pain and suffering, to arrive at 
dollar estimates of the cost of disease. 
 
Population displacement and emigration. Another direct effect of civil war is 
displacement.  The number of refugees around the world peaked at over 17 million in 
1992, but has barely fallen below 10 million since then (United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 2007).  However, by the end of 2006, the number of 
UNHCR “persons of concern” (which includes refugees, and Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs), and others) reached 32.9 million, whereas it hovered around 20 million 
for the preceding decade.  IDPs rose most in 2006.  Displaced persons and refugees are 
often unable to find work, and also need to be fed and housed.  Thus, an accounting of 
                                                 
11 According to the World Health Organization, “DALYs for a disease are the sum of the years of life lost 
due to premature mortality (YLL) in the population and the years lost due to disability (YLD) for incident 
cases of the health condition.” Further details on how DALYs are calculated are found at 
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/boddaly/en/. the costs of population displacement should include both the cost of their care and at least 
a partial measure of the opportunity cost of the population. 
 
Psychological effects and community life. Evidence from case studies suggests that the 
psychological effects of civil war are significant and long lasting.  For example, as cited 
in Collier et al. (2003), “approximately 68% of the Cambodia refugees on the Thai border 
displayed symptoms of major depression and 37% showed symptoms associated with 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).”  Community life under such conditions can be 
expected to suffer.  “Social capital,” according to Collier et al. (2003), is lost: “Civil war 
can have the effect of switching behavior from an equilibrium in which there is an 
expectation of honesty to one in which there is an expectation of corruption.”
12. 
 
However, the evidence on how civil war affects the psychology of war participants, 
victims, and community life is not completely one-sided.  Bellows and Miguel (2008) 
have used household data on conflict experiences and postwar outcomes to examine the 
effects of the 1991–2002 civil war in Sierra Leone.  They found those who experienced 
increased violence are 2.6 percent more likely to vote and 6.5 percent more likely to 
attend community meetings and contribute to public goods.  “Civil war experiences are 
transformative for many, and our analysis suggests that one short-run legacy is increasing 
individual political participation, community activism, and local public good 
provision.”
13  However, the sample is highly localized so that no general inference can be 
made about the whole country.  Blattman (2008) also finds that forcibly conscripted 
soldiers in Uganda actually increased their political participation compared to a control 
group.  These two studies raise the possibility that at least some individuals in some 
cultures might be psychologically resilient to being victims of violence in ways that make 
                                                 
12 Collier, Paul, V.L. Elliott, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and 
Nicholas Sambanis. 2003. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development 
Policy. Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 21. 
 
13 Bellows, John and Edward Miguel. 2008. “War and Local Collective Action in Sierra 
Leone.” Working Paper.   
 them, if they survive, more determined to participate socially and politically in their 
communities. 
 
Although many of the costs we have already mentioned are difficult to estimate, there are 
still others that are so difficult to estimate it is almost impossible to monetize them, and 
thus they are unable to be compared with the other costs.  For example, the very old, the 
very young, the infirm, and the poorest are more vulnerable to the direct and indirect 
effects of civil wars and are therefore more likely to suffer.  In other words, civil wars 
appear to disproportionately affect the poor and most vulnerable members of society.  
Studies like those of Merrouche (2008) do provide estimates of specific effects on 
poverty (landmines, in this case). Yet quantifying this effect beyond the reduction of 
income for those involved is a matter of debate.  Aggregate estimates of the increased 
risk of mortality and morbidity could identify some of the costs of poverty and 
vulnerability.  However, the value of less poverty in itself, or the possible higher value of 
an extra dollar to a poor versus a rich person are issues that have been, and will likely 
continue to be, debated within the economics and policy communities.  Justino (2006) 
provides a summary of research and of the methodological issues of both the effects of 
war on poverty and how chronic poverty might induce war.  
 
Collier et al. (2008) have ventured to make some overall estimates of the costs incurred 
by civil war.  Counting only the direct costs for an average low-income country, as well 
as those imposed on its neighbors as a result of the war, the estimated total cost is $43 
billion.
14 Adding estimates for the costs of death and DALYs yield a total minimum cost 
of almost $60 billion for a single civil war.  Based on that estimate and the number of 
civil wars that have taken place since 1960, the yearly cost of civil war is estimated to be 
$123 billion, which is about the same order of magnitude as the total annual development 
aid.  Collier et al. (2008), however, think that a better estimate of the indirect costs of a 
typical civil war is not $60 billion but closer to $250 billion.  That is, according to their 
                                                 
14  The costs to neighbors ($23 billion) are actually higher than those to the country itself ($20 billion).  
(There is no description in the paper of the methods used to arrive at the costs for the country itself.)  The 
estimates of the cost to neighbors use the results from Murdoch and Sandler (2002) that are based on an 
estimated growth model that allows for such spillover effects. estimates, the minimum cost of civil wars equals all the development aid provided, but is 
likely to be much higher than that. 
 
2.2 Lower-level Internal Conflicts 
 
Civil wars, by definition, result in many deaths (typically, 1,000) that involve the 
government and at least one other domestic organized adversary.  Conflicts with lower 
death tolls that are not formally classified as civil wars, however, can have high long-
term indirect costs as well.  Moreover, other lower-level conflicts between organized 
groups can involve violence or, even if there is no direct violence, the possibility of 
violence is ever present.  Strikes, road blockades, or protests that might have economic, 
ethnic, or regional motivation, or disputes between organized prospective squatters and 
landowners are examples of common conflicts.  As is the case with the other types of 
conflict we examine, these too involve direct and indirect costs.  However, there is rarely 
destruction of property, few direct deaths or injuries, and typically related actions are 
dispersed geographically, even if frequent and economically disruptive. As a result, there 
is little standardized information (or, “data”) that is systematically gathered so that even 
the most direct costs of such conflicts can be assessed.  Their long-term indirect effects, 
though, could be as economically disruptive as those of civil wars. 
 
Evia et al. (2008) use data on different incidents (strikes, road blockades, protest) from 
Bolivia between 1970 and 2005.  The time cost alone of the participants in such incidents 
was on the order of 1 percent of GDP. Such incidents can also have significant spillover 
effects on the economy. A strike in a manufacturing plant, for example, can affect the 
output of other downstream and upstream production. Similarly, a road blockade can 
bring about wide-ranging disruption in the affected city or region. On the other hand, a 
sit-in or protest with few participants does not have much of an effect on economic 
activity.  Based on assumptions of different multipliers regarding the spillover effects of 
different incidents, the average yearly cost of spillovers was estimated to be more than 3 
percent of GDP.  These costs varied widely over the years and were much higher for the 
mid-1980s and the 2002–2005 period, with some years approaching a loss of as much as 
a tenth of GDP.   
Riascos and Vargas (2004) summarize results of research that includes the costs of 
common crime and other conflict in Colombia. They estimate these to be at least 3 
percent of GDP, with some estimates going as high as 15 percent.  Note that a 3 percent 
annual cost of conflict implies that after 24 years, a country would have 50 percent less 
income than it would otherwise obtain in the absence of such conflict. 
 
2.3 Terrorism 
 
One definition of terrorism is the use of violence against civilians by organized groups.
15  
Since it is a tactic in the conduct of violence, it can and has been used in civil wars, other 
internal conflicts, and even in international disputes.  The disproportionately large 
number of civilian casualties (compared to previous wars) during the Second World War 
and wars since could be attributed to such a tactic (and the technology that made such 
tactics possible).  However, the data and the related empirical literature focus on the 
activities of organized groups that are often, but not always, militarily weak in other 
ways, and thus employ terrorism as a primary tactic.  For example, almost all instances of 
systematic mutilation or raping of civilians (which can have a political purpose from the 
perpetrator’s viewpoint) that have occurred in many post-World War II civil wars, 
especially those that have occurred in Africa, are not typically included in the data used 
in studies of terrorism. 
 
A main distinction is made between terrorism committed for domestic purposes, such as 
the actions of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka or Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain, 
and terrorism committed for transnational purposes, like those of al Qaeda.  Two recent 
overviews of the costs of terrorism are Enders (2007) and Sandler and Enders (2008). 
                                                 
15 Often it is specified that terrorist violence has a political purpose.  Whereas in the large majority of cases 
political purpose is a feature of what is called terrorism, there are some cases in which it does not have to 
be so.  For example, mafias and gangs can engage in terrorism in order to expand their turf and profits, and 
there is no scientific or policy reason for excluding in principle such activity from the definition of 
terrorism.  Sometimes actions of organized crime groups might even take political dimensions, even though 
the clarity of that dimension might be murky.  For example, Pablo Escobar, of the Colombian Medellin 
cartel, made a clear bid for political power by employing actions against civilians could be considered 
terrorism.  Another qualification typically provided, and which is followed by all the studies reviewed here, 
is that the organized groups are nonstate actors, even though, again, there is no scientific or policy reason 
that terrorist actions undertaken by governments should be excluded from consideration.  
With the exception of major incidents like those of 9/11 and the Madrid bombings, the 
direct costs of individual terrorist incidents are usually not large.  Even the direct cost of 
9/11 has not been large relative to GDP.
16  Therefore, the main effects that could exist, if 
any, would be indirect, confined to perceptions of security and their effect on investment 
and other economic activities. 
 
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) study the indirect effects of ETA on the economy of the 
Basque region of Spain from the mid-1970s onward, when ETA significantly expanded 
its operations.  They estimate what the Basque region’s per capita GDP would be in the 
absence of terrorism.  To do so, they create a “synthetic” region, a weighted composite 
region of the other regions of Spain (in terms of population and other key economic 
characteristics) which resembles the Basque region before the emergence of terrorism. 
This composite region is then compared to the actual Basque region.  They find that the 
Basque region by the late 1990s was about 10 percent poorer than it would have been 
without terrorism.  Abadie and Gardeazabal perform a number of robustness tests, 
including a “placebo” test in which they create a synthetic region that resembles 
Catalonia. This region, contrary to the composite Basque region, did not perform 
differently compared to the actual Catalonia region.  
 
On another tack, Blomberg et al. (2004) take a macroeconomic perspective on the issue.  
In addition to terrorism, they also examine the effects of internal and external conflict on 
growth across 177 countries.  They only consider transnational terrorist incidents, with 
the measures of internal conflict presumably being highly correlated with domestic 
terrorism.  Through cross-country regressions they find the effect of terrorism to be 
statistically significant, but the quantitative effect is economically very small and smaller 
than those of internal or external conflicts.  Furthermore, the estimation of a structural 
VAR model showed that negative shocks to GDP due to internal or external conflicts 
yield much larger and longer-lived effects than those obtained from a negative shock due 
                                                 
16 A direct cost estimate that includes the costs of destruction, cleanup, lost hours, and the values of lives 
lost on September 11, 2001, totals $48.7 billion (Enders 2007). to terrorism.  Blomberg et al. (2004) also find that terrorism has a strong negative impact 
on investment and a positive effect on government expenditures, thus providing a 
possible reason for the small economic effects of terrorism:  That is, governments might 
consciously counteract the negative effects on investment by increasing expenditures.  
Nevertheless, it might be more plausible that increases in government expenditures are 
actually due to increased security expenditures in response to terrorism.  This last 
possibility is corroborated by the fact that internal conflict induces higher government 
expenditures than terrorism does.  Curiously, though, internal conflict does not appear to 
have the expected negative effect on investment in Blomberg et al.’s study. 
  
The issue of terrorism’s impact on investment—specifically foreign direct investment 
(FDI)—is picked up by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008), who use a very different 
measure of terrorism than others.  Following the criticism of Frey et al. (2007), who 
argued that measures of terrorism underestimate the number of incidents and casualties, 
Abadie and Gardeazabal use the World Markets Research Centre’s Global Terrorism 
Index (GTI) as their terrorism variable. The GTI combines expert ratings at the country 
level and covers 186 countries and territories for the period 2003–2004 (World Markets 
Research Center 2003).  Abadie and Gardeazabal estimate a statistically significant effect 
of terrorism on FDI that may be economically significant.  Nevertheless, as Blomberg et 
al. (2004) suggest, such reductions in FDI may well not lead to lower growth because 
reduced investment may also be correlated with higher government expenditures.  
Furthermore, given that the GTI is compiled by country experts (typically not from the 
country being evaluated), the index may reflect not so much “terrorism” risk but the types 
of other risks that typically lead foreign investors to reduce investment in a country. That 
is, GTI might not be truly exogenous as far as its effect on FDI is concerned. 
 
The estimated costs of terrorism are either very small or, as in the case of Spain’s Basque 
region, of the order of 10 percent of GDP.  That is considerably lower than the effects of 
either civil war or lower-level internal conflict.  Moreover, as I have stressed, terrorism is 
a tactic and not an altogether different type of conflict.  ETA’s campaign used terrorist 
tactics but also, I suspect, the Basque region had more strikes, protests, and other manifestations of lower-level conflicts than other regions of Spain had.  That is, the 
difficulty of finding strong effects of terrorism could be due to the fact that it is inherently 
difficult to isolate terrorism’s effect from the broader context of conflict.  When terrorist 
tactics are isolated from broader internal conflicts, as in the case of richer countries (with 
exceptions like those of the Basque region), the effects are negligible.  When terrorism is 
just one part of a larger internal conflict, as it usually is in low-income countries, the 
effects are stronger as they are correlated with these broader conflicts. 
 
2.4 External Conflicts 
 
There have been considerably fewer external wars than internal wars since World War II, 
but the two types of war cannot be completely separated.  After all, for much of this time 
a “Cold” war was taking place which fueled high military expenditures by the United 
States, the Soviet Union, and their respective allies.  Moreover, from Vietnam and 
Cambodia to Angola and Nicaragua, some of the civil wars were at least partially or 
indirectly due to superpower rivalry, and the actions of proxies of the two superpowers 
were critical in the instigation or propagation of such wars.  More recently, the war that 
has taken place in Zaire/the Democratic Republic of Congo, even though is typically 
classified as a civil war, has involved the active participation of the militaries of Rwanda, 
Uganda, Angola, Zimbabue, Burundi, and Chad, while other countries, from Libya to 
South Africa provided considerable help to at least one of the many different sides that 
participated in that war (see Prunier, 2009). 
 
The most identifiable cost of partially external conflicts is military expenditures by 
governments.  (Of course, as mentioned earlier, for many countries that have experienced 
internal wars, government military expenditures have not been directed towards external 
adversaries but domestic ones.)  Such expenditures vary widely across different 
countries, rarely going below 1 percent of GDP. However, a few cases go above 10 
percent of GDP, such as Saudi Arabia.  In fact, for 1991 (and probably because of 
payments associated with the first Gulf War), Saudi Arabia’s military expenditures went 
over 22 percent of GDP. Japan’s military expenditures, on the other hand, have hovered 
around or just below 1 percent of GDP, although these expenditures have been large, consistently exceeding $40 billion over the past decade.
17  In 2004 world military 
spending was estimated to be over 1 trillion dollars, about 2.6 percent of world GDP 
(SIPRI, 2005). Military spending data does not include some other defense expenditures 
on intelligence or on civilian research and development (R&D) that is in practice military 
R&D.
18  Some evidence indicates that military spending has decreased from earlier 
decades.  Knight et al. (1996) report that military spending in a sample of 122 countries 
averaged almost 5.2 percent of GDP for the 1972–1985 period. 
 
A comprehensive accounting of the costs of an external war is offered by Stiglitz and 
Bilmes (2008), who estimate the cost of the Iraq war for the United States.  Stiglitz and 
Bilmes do not calculate the costs to Iraq itself, though they do provide a considered 
qualitative assessment of what it costs Iraq to be the battleground of war.  In their 
estimates, they include items such as the following: budgetary appropriations to date for 
military operations, and estimates for their future values, all appropriately discounted; 
future disability and health care for returning veterans; future costs of restoring the 
military to its prewar strength, replenishing spent armaments, repairing equipment where 
maintenance has been deferred; estimates of some costs to the economy (for example, in 
some scenarios, they allow for $5 and $10 increases in the price per barrel of oil to be 
attributed to the war); other macroeconomic effects, like the possible crowding out of 
some investment expenditures.  Overall, Stiglitz and Bilmes estimate that the total cost of 
the war ranges from $2.7 trillion in strictly budgetary costs to $5 trillion in total economic 
costs. 
 
                                                 
17 Note that, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Japan's 
Constitution prohibits a military and, thus, these are formally considered "police" or "internal security" 
expenditures. 
 
18 However, some military R&D expenditures have direct civilian applications or are disguised civilian 
R&D. In fact, many major breakthroughs in technology—the Internet, various high-tech materials, 
computers, shipbuilding—have their roots in military R&D. One could possibly argue, then, that military 
spending is worth it just for the tremendous technological benefits it has afforded nations. However, it must 
be asked why one should spend money on military R&D in the hope of receiving some future uncertain 
technological benefits rather than directly investing in R&D for targeted civilian applications. 
 Other than this recent work, there appears to be a relative scarcity of studies that estimate 
the long-term costs of external wars.  Blomberg et al. (2004) and Hess (2003) do so only 
parenthetically as they examine the effects of other types of conflict, though they both 
find that external wars negatively impact growth.   
 
However, an older literature regarding the effects of military expenditures on economic 
growth has found positive effects, presumably due to short-run demand effects or long-
run technological externality effects.  I will not review this literature here, but Knight et 
al. (1996) provide an overview and find negative effects on growth.  Moreover, as Dunne 
et al. (2005) point out, such empirical studies are hampered by the fact that they are based 
on either defense-economics models or expanded endogenous growth models that 
emphasize the possible technological externalities of military expenditures without taking 
adequate account of the resource cost of these expenditures.  Moreover, apparently in 
none of these empirical approaches is the possibility that military expenditures are 
determined strategically (that is, in reaction to potential adversaries). 
 
2.5 Overview of Costs 
 
I am aware of just one study that attempts a comprehensive estimate of the costs of 
conflict from many different sources: Hess (2003).
19 Hess adapts a model of Lucas 
(1987) that was meant to measure the costs of business cycles and uses it to estimate the 
impact of conflict, regarded as a “shock”, to consumption and welfare. No direct or 
indirect costs are calculated or estimated.  Instead, Hess compares the expected welfare 
of each country’s actual path of consumption - that may include conflict - to another 
counterfactual path of consumption where there is no state of war.  Using data from 1960 
to 1992, someone living in a county that experienced some conflict would permanently 
give up at least 8 percent of current consumption to live in a peaceful world; this figure is 
calculated by Hess as a lower bound of the true welfare cost of conflict.  Naturally, there 
is wide variation across countries.  All high-income countries included in the study 
(Australia, Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States) have 
                                                 
19 The study examines four types of external wars in terms of whether they were at home or not, and 
whether they were “small” or “large.” Internal wars are subdivided into genocides, ethnic conflicts, abrupt 
and disruptive regime changes, and revolutionary wars. considerably lower costs of consumption as a percentage of consumption (with France 
and the United States topping the list with just over 3 percent of their consumption), but 
still high costs in absolute terms.  Most African countries have higher costs than average, 
with Angola’s cost being over 40 percent of annual consumption.  Iraq tops the list with a 
cost of 65 percent of its annual consumption, while Iran’s cost is 26 percent—both high 
levels are due to the war fought by these two countries in the 1980s. 
 
The lower bound of the total world cost of conflict in 1985 dollars is estimated by Hess to 
be close to $400 billion to be paid every year, with that payment growing at the rate of 
population growth.  Given Collier et al.’s (2008) lower-bound estimate for the yearly cost 
of civil wars alone—$123 billion (in, presumably, 2008 dollars), and an average estimate 
of close to $500 billion—Hess’s lower-bound estimate for all types of conflicts appears 
reasonable.  Therefore, without even counting the extra military expenditures of the 
Unites States during the twenty first century, an overall annual cost of $1 trillion for 
organized violence should be considered a low-end estimate.  Taking into account 
military expenditures and other direct and indirect effects of conflict and violence would 
result in considerably higher cost estimates.  
 
3. Open Issues and Future Directions 
 
Economists have only recently been interested in the costs of conflict and violence as a 
legitimate policy concern and as an endeavor worthy of study.  With the exception of the 
literature that relates military expenditures to economic growth, virtually all research on 
the costs of conflict and violence has occurred over the past decade.  Already, though, the 
literature has grown extensively, and, if anything, the pace of research is gaining speed, 
especially research on civil war.  The increasing interest is obviously warranted given 
that the costs of conflict and violence are quantitatively very significant, arguably more 
significant than any other measured economic costs that might be relevant to economic 
development. 
  
Some direct costs are easily measurable, such as those due to destruction or increased 
government spending.  However, most costs, even direct ones such as those associated with death and injury, are not easy to estimate, let alone indirect costs that might result 
from lower investment, capital flight, or reduced tourism.  Such estimates are based on 
either deterministic scenarios or stochastic models that are econometrically estimated, the 
latter of which often suffer from small samples or even data of questionable provenance.  
Researchers and policymakers are unlikely to agree on the relevance or appropriateness 
of particular scenarios or models and, therefore, on the estimated costs derived from 
them.  It is healthy, even vital, to consider a wide range of opinions and methodologies—
such diversity is often key to arriving at well-rounded estimates.  In some cases, general 
agreement might be unattainable simply because there are too many disagreements about 
processes or causal mechanisms. Finally, the personal views of those involved may 
significantly cloud the issue (as, for example, when poverty and inequality are considered 
to have costs beyond those that reduce a country’s income). 
 
I will now briefly discuss remaining issues and future directions for measuring and 
estimating costs associated with the four types of conflict reviewed.  I will close with 
general remarks on assessing the costs of conflict. 
 
Civil wars. As is apparent from the work reviewed here, civil wars have received the 
lion’s share of researchers’ attention.  Such attention seems warranted when one 
considers the large number of civil wars in the post-war period, not to mention their 
human and economic costs.  Detailed studies of country experiences along with 
comparative assessments, such as those discussed in Stewart and Fitzgerald (2001), are 
helpful complements to econometric studies that rely on more aggregated data.  In 
particular, it is encouraging to witness recent trends in microbased studies, such as those 
of Bellows and Miguel (2008) or Blattman (2008), which follow samples of war-affected 
soldiers or individuals involved to determine both the individual and community 
consequences of war.  Such approaches already challenge some of our preconceptions of 
the effects of war on individuals and their communities (or, “social capital”) and 
additional studies are needed to clarify those effects.  Are former victims of violence 
truly better adjusted because of self-selection—in the sense that those who are poorly adjusted might be more likely to die or be excluded from studies—or have war 
experiences truly galvanized them to become civically engaged? 
 
Collier et al. (2003) have emphasized the possible negative impact civil wars have on 
social capital and trust—and, in turn, on economic growth.  They do not provide, 
however, much evidence to support that negative relationship.  Therefore, 
operationalizing notions of social capital in various settings and examining its 
relationship to both the direction of civil war and economic growth is certainly a worthy 
avenue for future research.  The effect of civil wars on poverty and inequality, and the 
costs associated with them, are also of obvious continued interest.   
 
Another quantitatively important effect emphasized by Collier et al. (2003) and Collier et 
al. (2008) is the spillover effect of war on neighboring countries, following on the work 
of Murdoch and Sandler (2002), who appear to have made the sole estimates of such 
spillover effects.  Finally, the expected effect of internal wars and other types of conflict 
on investment and capital flight does not always appear as statistically or economically 
significant (for example, see Blomberg et al., 2004).  Since this effect is expected to be 
one of the key channels through which wars negatively impinge economic growth, it is 
important to continue investigating the relationship both in country and comparative 
studies. 
   
Lower-level internal conflicts. As argued by Sambanis (2004), the particular definition of 
civil war adopted in any cross-country comparison can significantly change the results.  
This is indicative of the fact that civil wars are not completely distinct from all other 
types of internal (or external) conflict.  Rather, there is a continuum of conflict intensities 
that might include, say, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda on one end of 
the spectrum, and the myriad of internal conflicts that involve minimal violence or the 
threat of violence (such as strikes or road blockades) on the other.  The middle and lower 
ends of the spectrum have been understudied, and severely so when compared to the 
study of civil wars. 
 Examples of such violence abound.  In addition to the war in Aceh province, violence has 
been endemic over at least the past decade to Indonesia, from the Mollucas to Borneo and 
Irian Jaya, to Javanese villages and towns. Furthermore, the motives of this violence have 
been difficult to decipher.  (They can be characterized as overtly religious, ethnic, 
economic, or regional, but one must be careful about what appears as overt.)  Similarly, 
conflict has been continual in Nigeria’s delta since the Biafra war, and recently has flared 
up with consequences for oil production there.  In Brazil and other Latin American 
countries, there are systematic disputes over land rights, pitting large landowners against 
organized unions of squatters. These sometimes involve deadly clashes of private security 
forces and union members.  Some of these disputes can be considered economic, as they 
focus on the disposition of revenues from exportable natural resources. They have been 
studied as such under the rubric of the “natural resource curse”.
20  Nevertheless, there has 
been no effort to systematically create databases that classify and measure aspects of 
these softer types of internal conflicts as there has been for civil wars.  Yet, given the 
limited evidence obtained thus far, the long-term costs of such conflicts could well be of 
a similar order of magnitude to those of civil wars.  It is highly advisable, then, to collect 
evidence at both the micro and macro levels, as has been done in research on civil wars. 
 
Terrorism. Since terrorism is correlated with other types of conflict, it is difficult to 
isolate the effects of the tactic itself from the wider conflict to which it might be a part.  
Future studies would find value in pursuing the approach of Blomberg et al. (2004), who 
include in regressions other types of conflict to tease out substitution or complementary 
effects.  
 
External conflicts. A major unresolved issue that pertains to the costs of external wars is 
that of the relationship between military expenditures and economic growth.  As we 
mentioned above, the main problem is disentangling the negative effect of military 
spending that results from the reduction of resources that become unavailable for 
consumption or investment—and any distortions that might be associated with these—
from the possible positive effects of military spending that results because output is 
below its potential level or that results from technological and organizational externality 
                                                 
20 See for example Ross (2003) and Mehlum et al. (2006). effects to the rest of the economy.  It appears that all of the models thus estimated do not 
adequately take into account the resource cost of military expenditures. They especially 
fail to take into account the endogeneity of expenditures to those of other countries or to 
the choices of internal potential enemies (to the extent that some countries direct their 
military expenditures against such enemies).
21  It is therefore advisable to account for how 
strategic feedback affects security and military expenditures when studying their effect on 
economic growth.   
 
Furthermore, the related literature has relied solely on cross-country evidence using aggregated 
data (for example, GDP, investment, military expenditures, and other aggregate variables).  More 
detailed country case studies could break down the various components of military expenditures, 
investment, and other variables.  Institutional knowledge of a country’s economy and government 
should not be ignored when making assessments about the composition of these components, 
their relationship to each other, and to economic growth. 
 
Adding up the costs of organized violence. I am not aware of any attempt to add up all the 
types of organized violence costs that are reviewed in this paper.  Hess (2003) comes 
closest, but as discussed earlier, his approach is highly indirect and “top-down” in that he 
estimates, using a cross-country econometric framework, the effects of the “shock” of 
conflict on consumption. Whereas this is a valuable approach that has produced plausible 
estimates (and expanding and refining Hess’s approach would be most welcome), there is 
scope in also pursuing a “bottom-up” approach, whereby direct and indirect costs of the 
various types of organized violence are estimated and tabulated for individual countries 
and for the whole world.  Collier et al. (2008) do provide overall estimates for the cost of 
civil wars, but there is no documentation in that paper on how these estimates were 
derived.  Having both bottom-up and top-down estimates of the total costs of organized 
violence would help check the plausibility of the other mechanism. If the estimates do not 
vary too widely from one another, one can have high confidence in them. 
 
                                                 
21  Models that do take into account this endogeneity include Hirshleifer (1995), Grossman and Kim (1996), 
and others reviewed in Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007). A final, fundamental issue of concern to economists and policymakers must be 
mentioned, though unfortunately not in appreciable detail.
22  An argument could be made 
that at least some of the costs of war and violence are necessary, as they could be 
considered the costs of “enforcing property rights” by states or other organized interests.  
Military expenditures and other security costs, even possibly the very destruction that 
ensues from the outbreak of wars, could be considered a necessary input into an output 
called “security.” Therefore, from a social welfare perspective, these may not be 
considered avoidable (without incurring other costs at some point). A very short response 
to this suggestion would first point out that, contrary to other inputs in economics, the 
inputs to conflict and violence are combined in an adversarial fashion, not cooperatively 
as are inputs to ordinary production.  Secondly, military increases by one party that are 
met with similar increases by another would increase the costs of security to both parties 
without necessarily changing the security of either, however that latter is measured.  (On 
the contrary, the military build-up could make war more likely, and, as a result, decrease 
the security of both.) Whereas the response of states and other organized groups could 
indeed be considered individually rational in the short term, it does not imply that the 
resulting state of affairs is socially rational.  The outcome is similar to that of the 
prisoners’ dilemma:  if each side could commit to their actions, they could achieve a 
better outcome for both.  Furthermore, economists routinely calculate the costs of socially 
suboptimal actions (such as those of trade protection) in other settings, where the actual 
policies are compared to ideal policies.  Likewise, then, we can think of the costs of 
organized violence as due to deviations of actual security policies that are suboptimal 
from an ideal world. What is also different from other settings, however, is the possibility 
that in the actual world, the costs of providing security may increase dramatically while 
the benefits derived from it are drastically reduced, as is the case in wars that escalate 
beyond the original expectations of their participants.   
  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
22  For a detailed treatment of related issues, see Skaperdas (2008). BIBLIOGRAPHY 
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